South Asia crisis, 1971"The scope of this volume is limited to the political crisis that began in Pakistan in March 1971 with the government's efforts to suppress Bengali demands for virtual autonomy in East Pakistan and concluded with the establishment of the state of Bangladesh at the end of the year. The limited time frame covered by the volume enabled the editor to compile the record of the Nixon administration's response to the crisis in considerable detail. The crisis was managed largely out of the White House by President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, with the support of the National Security Council staff. The focus of the volume is on the management of the crisis by Nixon and Kissinger. The editor selected documentation to trace the evolution of the United States response to the crisis from Nixon's initial reluctance to become involved to his "tilt" toward Pakistan which was highlighted by the despatch of the aircraft carrier Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal to act as a restraint on India in the war that had developed between India and Pakistan as a result of the crisis. Nixon's response to the crisis in Pakistan was conditioned in part by the concern that he and Kissinger had to protect the emerging opening to China, which had been facilitated by Pakistani President Yahya Khan. The volume documents that concern, as well as the assurance offered to China that the United States would protect China from the Soviet Union if China took military action against India in support of Pakistan. The record of the Nixon administration's management of the crisis in South Asia thus also bears importantly on United States relations at the time with China and the Soviet Union. In that respect, the volume should be read in conjunction with Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume XVII, China, 1969-1972; volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970- October 1971; and volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971-May 1971"--Overview. |
From inside the book
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Page 64
... military course of action . But he recalled that everyone had been taken by surprise when the negotiations broke down and Yahya turned to military action . Mr. Sisco noted that the U.S. and President Yahya both have a large stake in the ...
... military course of action . But he recalled that everyone had been taken by surprise when the negotiations broke down and Yahya turned to military action . Mr. Sisco noted that the U.S. and President Yahya both have a large stake in the ...
Page 68
... military intervention in support of the West Pakistani course does " not now seem likely " although they may in- crease deliveries of military equipment . The Chinese however , may in time face a dilemma should an extremist group come ...
... military intervention in support of the West Pakistani course does " not now seem likely " although they may in- crease deliveries of military equipment . The Chinese however , may in time face a dilemma should an extremist group come ...
Page 70
... military actions . -Privately telling Yahya we think his present course is tantamount to national suicide and urging him on to an early political settlement . --- Suspend all military sales , including implementation of the one- time ...
... military actions . -Privately telling Yahya we think his present course is tantamount to national suicide and urging him on to an early political settlement . --- Suspend all military sales , including implementation of the one- time ...
Page 71
... military action against the Bengalis . We would explain our actions in terms of present inability to carry out many activities , especially those in East Pakistan and hold out hope for full resumption as soon as conditions permit and ...
... military action against the Bengalis . We would explain our actions in terms of present inability to carry out many activities , especially those in East Pakistan and hold out hope for full resumption as soon as conditions permit and ...
Page 72
... military supply in the " options open " posture on the grounds that it contributes very little in the short run to the Pak mili- tary machine but to continue such supply would break any link we may have with the Bengalis . Farland ...
... military supply in the " options open " posture on the grounds that it contributes very little in the short run to the Pak mili- tary machine but to continue such supply would break any link we may have with the Bengalis . Farland ...
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Common terms and phrases
action agreed Ambassador Farland army asked Assistant for National attack Awami League Bangla Desh Bengali Bhutto border ceasefire Central Files China Chinese conversation crisis Dacca December December 12 Delhi discussion Document draft East Bengal East Pakistan effort Embassy forces Foreign Minister Foreign Secretary Gandhi Government guerrillas Haig Helms Hilaly Hollen Ibid India India and Pakistan Irwin Islamabad issue Johnson Kissinger Papers Kissinger's meeting memorandum military supply million Moorer move Mujib Mujibur Mukti Bahini National Archives National Security Affairs Nixon Presidential Materials noted NSC Files Packard Pakistan Army political accommodation political settlement President Nixon President Yahya President's Assistant Prime Minister problem refugees relief resolution Saunders Security Council Singh Sisco situation source text South Asia Soviet Union talk Telegram text not declassified tion United Vorontsov Washington West White House Williams WSAG Yahya Khan