South Asia crisis, 1971"The scope of this volume is limited to the political crisis that began in Pakistan in March 1971 with the government's efforts to suppress Bengali demands for virtual autonomy in East Pakistan and concluded with the establishment of the state of Bangladesh at the end of the year. The limited time frame covered by the volume enabled the editor to compile the record of the Nixon administration's response to the crisis in considerable detail. The crisis was managed largely out of the White House by President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, with the support of the National Security Council staff. The focus of the volume is on the management of the crisis by Nixon and Kissinger. The editor selected documentation to trace the evolution of the United States response to the crisis from Nixon's initial reluctance to become involved to his "tilt" toward Pakistan which was highlighted by the despatch of the aircraft carrier Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal to act as a restraint on India in the war that had developed between India and Pakistan as a result of the crisis. Nixon's response to the crisis in Pakistan was conditioned in part by the concern that he and Kissinger had to protect the emerging opening to China, which had been facilitated by Pakistani President Yahya Khan. The volume documents that concern, as well as the assurance offered to China that the United States would protect China from the Soviet Union if China took military action against India in support of Pakistan. The record of the Nixon administration's management of the crisis in South Asia thus also bears importantly on United States relations at the time with China and the Soviet Union. In that respect, the volume should be read in conjunction with Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume XVII, China, 1969-1972; volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970- October 1971; and volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971-May 1971"--Overview. |
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Page 58
... supply . Mr. Kissinger : Did they think West Pakistan could win with 30,000 troops ? Adm . Moorer : Yes . Mr. Irwin : How important is West Pakistan's concern that East Pakistan would be helpful in a war ? Adm . Moorer : Their principal ...
... supply . Mr. Kissinger : Did they think West Pakistan could win with 30,000 troops ? Adm . Moorer : Yes . Mr. Irwin : How important is West Pakistan's concern that East Pakistan would be helpful in a war ? Adm . Moorer : Their principal ...
Page 59
... supply , etc. Mr. Sisco : These decisions will all have to be taken within the broader framework . We will have to try to reach a judgment on the ba- sis of the circumstances . I think the military picture may be inconclu- sive for some ...
... supply , etc. Mr. Sisco : These decisions will all have to be taken within the broader framework . We will have to try to reach a judgment on the ba- sis of the circumstances . I think the military picture may be inconclu- sive for some ...
Page 60
... supply the food , it would be pretty strong medicine . Mr. Irwin : We can wait and see how things develop with the international agencies . Mr. Kissinger : What will we know then that we don't know now ? Mr. Irwin : I have talked with ...
... supply the food , it would be pretty strong medicine . Mr. Irwin : We can wait and see how things develop with the international agencies . Mr. Kissinger : What will we know then that we don't know now ? Mr. Irwin : I have talked with ...
Page 61
... supply , ideally to both the cities and the countryside . But we could not accept working with West Pakistan if that meant starving the coun- tryside . I don't know how we solve this . Mr. Kissinger : We have to get at the implications ...
... supply , ideally to both the cities and the countryside . But we could not accept working with West Pakistan if that meant starving the coun- tryside . I don't know how we solve this . Mr. Kissinger : We have to get at the implications ...
Page 64
... supply any small arms that might be needed . Mr. Blee said that the Indians do not have a large enough quan- tity of unmarked , unattributable weapons to supply what the East Pakistanis need in the quantities they need , so there would ...
... supply any small arms that might be needed . Mr. Blee said that the Indians do not have a large enough quan- tity of unmarked , unattributable weapons to supply what the East Pakistanis need in the quantities they need , so there would ...
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Common terms and phrases
action agreed Ambassador Farland army asked Assistant for National attack Awami League Bangla Desh Bengali Bhutto border ceasefire Central Files China Chinese conversation crisis Dacca December December 12 Delhi discussion Document draft East Bengal East Pakistan effort Embassy forces Foreign Minister Foreign Secretary Gandhi Government guerrillas Haig Helms Hilaly Hollen Ibid India India and Pakistan Irwin Islamabad issue Johnson Kissinger Papers Kissinger's meeting memorandum military supply million Moorer move Mujib Mujibur Mukti Bahini National Archives National Security Affairs Nixon Presidential Materials noted NSC Files Packard Pakistan Army political accommodation political settlement President Nixon President Yahya President's Assistant Prime Minister problem refugees relief resolution Saunders Security Council Singh Sisco situation source text South Asia Soviet Union talk Telegram text not declassified tion United Vorontsov Washington West White House Williams WSAG Yahya Khan